Background
During the last decade, the issue of international cooperation in climate protection has received increasing attention in economic research. The main focus has been on the underlying economic incentives for sovereign states to enter into international environmental agreements. Since climate protection constitutes the problem of providing a global public good, it is faced with severe incentive problems for governments that try to maximize their net economic benefits. The game-theoretical literature has provided important insights into the difficulties of establishing effective and efficient cooperation on the provision of climate protection (see Finus (2001) for an overview).
Beyond the fundamental incentive problems of international cooperation, climate change policy has an important political economy dimension. In the standard political economy approach, any government is motivated by the objective of maximizing its political income, i.e. the probability of being re-elected. In order to be re-elected, the government must obey the preferences of the pivotal voter, who can be approximated by the median voter in a democracy. Thus, the national median voter imposes a restriction on what would be acceptable to a government in international environmental negotiations. Ultimately, one would expect a government only to enter into agreements that are acceptable to the median voter. From a political economy point of view, thus, the median voter's willingness to pay ultimately determines the outcome of international environmental negotiations. Surprisingly, this fact has been widely ignored in the literature (one notable exception is Congleton (1992) ).
We investigate the political economy conjecture for the case of the Kyoto Protocol. This Protocol was negotiated in 1997 during the Third Conference of the Parties (COP3) to the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change. It requires industrialized countries (as listed in its Annex B) to limit their emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), most notably CO 2 from fossil fuel combustion. Initially, the Kyoto Protocol was supposed to provide a large cutback in business-as-usual emissions for the developed world and, therefore, was celebrated as a breakthrough in international climate protection (Oberthür and Ott (1999) ).
Based on calculations with an established computable general equilibrium model of global trade and energy use, we show that the Kyoto treaty -in its original from -would have not only effected a substantial cutback in the developed world's business-as-usual emissions but also imposed non-negligible costs for major signatory countries. In our analysis, we use the associated per-capita costs of implementing Kyoto as a measure for the required willingness to pay for having such a climate policy enacted.
The Kyoto conference in 1997 left open several crucial aspects of concrete implementation, especially with respect to carbon sinks, i.e. forests and agricultural soils that store CO 2 , and the question of full versus restricted tradability of emission rights across Annex B countries.
Re-negotiations during COP6 at Bonn (June 2001) and COP7 at Marrakech (November 2001) led to a generous accounting of carbon sinks and unrestricted trade in emissions rights.
Particularly free permit trade accommodates larger cuts in overall compliance costs because Russia and Ukraine can sell huge amounts of surplus emission rights (so called "hot air") which was ceded to them in the original Kyoto deal. We show that even under these relaxed constraints, implementation of the Kyoto Protocol would still have been quite costly for the U.S. Since public opinion polls in the U.S. indicate a rather low willingness to pay for climate policy and re-negotiation leeway had been exhausted, the withdrawal of the U.S. government from the Kyoto Protocol in March 2001 does not come as a surprise from a political economy point of view.
Ironically, U.S. withdrawal can be regarded as ultimate impetus for the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. The reason is the so-called "double trigger" for entering into force of the Protocol. On the one side, at least 55 countries have to ratify the treaty by their national parliaments. On the other side, those countries which ratify the treaty have to account for at least 55 % of the CO 2 emissions in 1990 (the Protocol's baseyear). Since the U.S. is by far the biggest emitter of CO 2 among Annex B parties, ratification of the Kyoto Protocol after U.S. withdrawal requires approval of the remaining major parties. More specifically, it was no longer possible for the Kyoto Protocol to enter into force the without participation of Russia or the country group of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. After U.S. withdrawal, these countries used their veto bargaining power in the subsequent climate negotiations at Bonn (June 2001) and Marrakech (November 2001) to obtain far-reaching concessions from the European Union (EU) on the controversial issues of sink credits and emissions trading.
Our simulation results show that these concessions reduce Kyoto to a symbolic treaty.
Ratification of the treaty for the remaining Annex B countries now comes at virtually no economic costs while environmental effectiveness is driven close to zero. 4 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents cost estimates of implementing Kyoto in its original form. Section 3 explains the recent U.S. withdrawal from a political economy perspective. Section 4 explores the implications of U.S. withdrawal on the subsequent climate policy negotiations. Section 5 concludes.
Emission Reduction Constraints and Required Willingness to Pay
In the Kyoto Protocol, industrialized countries have adopted quantified emission limitation and reduction objectives with reference to their 1990 emission levels. The column labeled "Baseline Emissions -1990" of Table 1 lists the historic emissions for all Annex B regions, while the column labeled "Nominal Reduction" provides the reduction targets as originally foreseen by the Protocol. For reasons of data availability, we apply the GHG reduction targets to CO 2 only, which is by far the most important GHG among industrialized countries. The reduction targets with respect to 1990 are only nominal in the sense that they apply to historic emission levels. Since these targets will not become legally binding before the Kyoto commitment period (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , the appropriate reference for the effective cutback requirements are the business-as-usual (BaU) Protocol that are well in excess of their anticipated future BaU emissions. As will be elaborated below, the availability of these excess emissions, referred to as "hot air", will crucially affect the potential compliance costs of OECD countries under the Kyoto Protocol.
The column labeled "Absolute Cutback" converts the effective percentage reduction into absolute cutback requirements. An assessment of Table 1 Given some indication of the voter's actual willingness to pay for climate protection, the key issue regarding political acceptance of the Kyoto Protocol are the compliance costs associated with the implementation of the Kyoto targets. These compliance costs can be readily interpreted as the required willingness to pay to have the Kyoto targets enacted. To measure compliance costs, we employ an established computable general equilibrium model of world trade and energy use that simulates the economic adjustment costs to emission constraints. The general equilibrium approach provides a consistent and comprehensive framework for studying price-dependent interactions between the energy system and the rest of the economy. It has become the standard tool for the analysis of the economy-wide impacts of greenhouse gas abatement policies on resource allocation and the associated implications for incomes of economic agents (see Weyant (1999) for a recent survey on model-based studies). 6 The concrete multi-sector, multi-region model underlying our analysis has been extensively used in the past to quantify the economic impacts of alternative GHG abatement strategies (see e.g. Böhringer (2000) , Rutherford and Paltsev (2000) , Böhringer (2002) , Böhringer and Rutherford (2002) , Böhringer and Löschel (2002) ). For the sake of brevity, we abstain here from presenting a comprehensive appendix on the model algebra and the model parameterization, which can be downloaded from ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/div/kppolecon.pdf. We use this model to quantify the economic and environmental consequences of abatement policies with respect to the BaU situation in 2010, which is based on most recent projections of the U.S. Department of Energy (IEO (2001)). Due to a dominant supply position stemming from huge amounts of hot air (see Table 1 ), FSU is treated as monopolist on imperfectly competitive international permit markets (Westkog (1996) ). As a monopolist, FSU restricts permit supply by charging a mark-up over its marginal abatement cost (which are zero for hot air) to maximize profits. Table 2 The figures presented in Table 2 are based on central case elasticities (see Table A .7 of appendix). To evaluate the sensitivity of our model estimates to uncertainties in the parameterization space, we have performed an extensive sensitivity analysis. The sensitivity analysis confirms robustness of results with respect to key elasticities and alternative baseline assumptions. In the remainder of our analysis, we, therefore, interpret the per-capita cost figures of Table 2 as required WTP of countries that are engaged in the climate change negotiations.
The Rationale behind U.S. Withdrawal
We have argued that in a political economy context, governments will keep the preferences of their voters in mind. They will not agree upon treaties that would not find the support of the median voter at home. To investigate the prospects of GHG abatement policies, we must compare the required willingness to pay (WTP) with the actual (revealed) WTP for climate protection by the domestic median voter. The required WTP for the U.S. as quantified in Murdoch and Sandler (1997) for the case of ozone layer depletion.
However, their study stands as a rare, if not unique attempt to measure environmental demand in the context of a global public good. Second, one could try to detect people's preferences by asking them directly, e.g. by using the framework of a contingent valuation study. This type of study has also been used extremely seldom to address the question of environmental demand in an international context. We only know of one contingent valuation study in this context, that has been performed for Switzerland (see Ledergerber et al. (1995) ).
It seems, hence, appropriate to rely on public opinion polls as reported in Tables 3 and 4 for the U.S. Some difficulties in interpretation arise with respect to the obscure category "neither willing nor unwilling". To our understanding, these respondents indicated that they do not want a change of the status quo. We therefore add them to those respondents that are opposed to higher taxes or cuts in their standard of living. The tables then clearly show that a vast majority of U.S. citizens is not willing to pay much higher taxes or to accept cuts in their standard of living in order to protect the environment.
Moreover, this fraction of respondents rose from about 60 % in 1993 to about 70 % in 2000. Even if we skip the category "neither willing nor unwilling", the recent polls for 2000 report a distinct majority of people that are opposed to higher eco-taxes or income losses for the sake of the environment. Sum (4) and (5) 39.4 41.39
Sum (3), (4) and (5) It must be conceded that the polls asked for the protection of the environment in general and so are not specific to the problem of climate change. However, as we can see from Table   5 , the topic "Environment " is strongly dominated by other issues like "Ethics", "Crime", or "Drugs". Moreover, "global warming" is a very low ranking issue even on the environmental agenda (see Table 6 -entries show the percentage of respondents who "worried a great deal").
Hence, we can safely conclude that if willingness to pay for the protection of the environment as a whole is already low, it will be even lower for climate change protection in particular.
The Bush administration obviously perceived that compliance to Kyoto even in its "lite" version would have imposed substantial costs on the U.S. economy. Furthermore, the U.S.
recognized that additional negotiation to make the Protocol acceptable to the U.S. public was not possible. The two key issues of re-negotiation, sinks and tradability, had been already very stressed in the climate negotiations prior to U.S. withdrawal. There was no more leeway fair that undeveloped countries should not be held to the same pollution standards, since they still need to catch up with the rest of the developed countries' (Wirthlin (1998), p.6).
The Implications of U.S. Withdrawal
U.S. withdrawal had a major impact on the subsequent climate negotiations, since it gave veto bargaining power to important single countries in the climate talks. Due to the "double trigger" mechanism, entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol is no longer possible without participation of Russia and the country group of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan.
All of these regions have expressed reluctance to agree to the Protocol without major revisions to its original amendments.
After Protocol have drastically reduced compliance costs. The downside is that the environmental effectiveness of the Protocol is driven close to zero as hot air from FSU can be fully traded (see also Böhringer (2002) ).
In our political economy context, one can assert that U.S. withdrawal has significantly promoted the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol because it essentially reduces compliance for remaining Annex B countries to mere symbolic policy. Table 8 also provides interesting insights on the self-declared "climate leadership" of the EU. In cross-country comparison of implementation costs, EU ranks lowest. WTP for the implementation of Kyoto in its original form would have required a WTP which is five times higher in AUN and seven times higher in CAN than in EUR. It is unlikely that WTP in these countries would have ever reached such high levels. For the EU, however, it has been very easy to act as a protagonist of ambitious reduction targets, since the implied costs for the EU would have been relatively low. 
Conclusion
We tried to shed some light on recent developments in the climate change negotiations from a political economy point of view. We have shown that U.S. withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol is straightforward given the potential compliance costs and the domestic voters' low willingness to pay.
U.S. withdrawal in 2001 had a major impact on the subsequent climate policy negotiations at Bonn and Marrakech since it endowed remaining key parties with veto bargaining power.
Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Russia thus could achieve far-reaching concessions from the EU on carbon sinks and tradability of emission rights, particularly hot air trade from the Former Soviet Union. Taking these concessions into account, Kyoto reduces to a symbolic treaty that codifies more or less business-as-usual emissions and makes compliance a rather cheap deal.
